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tifiably has ignored the detriment suffered by children who are de-
prived of an adequate education.7 0 As a consequence of the court's
decision, neither a judicial nor an administrative remedy is availa-
ble when a private school fails to provide the bargained-for educa-
tion.7 1 It is hoped that the Court of Appeals soon will have the
opportunity to rectify this most unfortunate result.
Diane M. Trippany
A criminal defendant has no constitutional right to standby coun-
sel while conducting a pro se defense
The sixth amendment to the federal Constitution affords a
criminal defendant the right to effective assistance of counse 7 2 and
the right to appear pro se."3 Although it appears that a defendant
70 See, e.g., Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 App. Div. 2d at 39, 407
N.Y.S.2d at 882-85 (Suozzi, J., dissenting).
7 See supra notes 68-69
72 The sixth amendment provides that "[fin all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. CONsT. amend.
VI. This amendment has been held to guarantee to criminal defendants the right to effective
assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938). The court will determine that there has been a denial of
effective representation by counsel "only when the representation given is so patently lack-
ing in competence or adequacy that it becomes the duty of the court to be aware of it and
correct it." People v. Tomaselli, 7 N.Y.2d 350, 356, 165 N.E.2d 551, 555, 197 N.Y.S.2d 697,
702 (1960).
Although the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel has been held
applicable to the states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 71 (1932), New York has afforded criminal defendants this protection independently of
the fourteenth amendment, see People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 161, 385 N.E.2d 612, 615,
412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 876 (1978); N.Y.CoNsT. art. I, § 6; CPL § 210.15(2) (1971). Specifically,
the New York Constitution provides that "[i]n any trial in any court whatever the party
accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel." N.Y. CONST. art.
I, § 6; see CPL § 210.15(2) (1971). For a discussion of the right to counsel guarantees that
New York has granted to criminal defendants, see Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees
and Protection of Defendant's Rights: The Case of New York, 1960-1978, 28 BUFFALO L.
REV. 157, 178-92 (1979).
13See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975). The right to appear pro se has
been recognized as implicit in the sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of coun-
sel. Id. In Faretta, the Supreme Court stated:
[T]he right of an accused to conduct his own defense seems to cut against the
grain of... decisions holding that.., no accused can be convicted and impris-
oned unless he had been accorded the right to the assistance of counsel.
[However,] [i]t is one thing to hold that every defendant ... has the right to the
assistance of counsel, and quite another to say that a State may compel a defen-
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simultaneously could exercise both rights consistently with the
sixth amendment, a number of jurisdictions have considered these
guarantees mutually exclusive. 4 Thus, a criminal defendant who
elects to proceed pro se often is precluded from securing the assis-
dant to accept a lawyer he does not want.
Id. at 832-33 (citations omitted). Even prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Faretta, the
constitutions of 36 states expressly conferred this pro se right, some declaring that the right
was derived from the United States Constitution. See id. at 813-14 & nn.10-11; see, e.g.,
ARiz. CONsT. art. II, § 24 (right to be heard, or to defend in person and by counsel); TEx.
CONsT. art. I, § 10 (right to defend either by himself, by counsel, or both); WASH. CONST. art.
I, § 22 (right to defend in person or by counsel). Moreover, as early as 1933, the New York
Court of Appeals recognized that "under both our Federal and State Constitutions, a defen-
dant has the right to defend in person or by counsel of his own choosing." People v. Price,
262 N.Y. 410, 412, 187 N.E. 298, 299 (1933). New York has continued to acknowledge the
defendant's right to conduct his own defense. See, e.g., People v. McIntyre, 36 N.Y.2d 10,
14, 324 N.E.2d 322, 325, 364 N.Y.S.2d 837, 842 (1974); People v. McLaughlin, 291 N.Y. 480,
482, 53 N.E.2d 356, 357 (1944); People v. Pippin, 67 App. Div. 2d 413, 416-17, 415 N.Y.S.2d
654, 655 (1st Dep't 1979); People v. Kelly, 60 App. Div. 2d 220, 223, 400 N.Y.S.2d 82, 84 (1st
Dep't 1977), afl'd mem., 44 N.Y.2d 725, 376 N.E.2d 931, 405 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1978); People v.
Yates, 45 App. Div. 2d 778, 778, 356 N.Y.S.2d 713, 715 (3d Dep't 1974).
It should be noted that the defendant's right to proceed pro se is a qualified one. People
v. McIntyre, 36 N.Y.2d 10, 16-17, 324 N.E.2d 322, 327, 364 N.Y.S.2d 837, 844 (1974). The
Court of Appeals has articulated three preliminary requirements that must be fulfilled
before a defendant may conduct a pro se defense: "(1) The request [must be] unequivocal
and timely asserted, (2) there [must be] a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to
counsel, [and] (3) the defendant [must] not [have] engaged in conduct which would prevent
the fair and orderly exposition of the issues." Id. at 17, 324 N.E.2d at 327, 364 N.Y.S.2d at
844. As a corollary to the requirement of a "knowing and intelligent" waiver, the defendant
must be apprised adequately of the dangers inherent in a pro se defense. See People v. Carl,
46 N.Y.2d 806, 808, 386 N.E.2d 828, 829, 413 N.Y.S.2d 916, 918 (1978). The failure to so
advise the defendant will necessitate the granting of a new trial. See, e.g., People v. Harris,
85 App. Div. 2d 742, 744, 445 N.Y.S.2d 801, 804 (2d Dep't 1981). Although McIntyre was a
pre-Faretta decision, courts consistently have recognized the applicability of these require-
ments in post-Faretta cases. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 49 N.Y.2d 114, 119, 400 N.E.2d 313,
316, 424 N.Y.S.2d 372, 375 (1979) (unequivocal request to proceed pro se); People v. Reason,
37 N.Y.2d 351, 356, 334 N.E.2d 572, 575, 372 N.Y.S.2d 614, 618 (1975) (knowing and intelli-
gent waiver); People v. Pippin, 67 App. Div. 2d 413, 417, 415 N.Y.S.2d 654, 655 (1st Dep't
1979) (fair and orderly exposition of the issues).
7" See, e.g., Reliford v. People, 195 Colo. 549, 579 P.2d 1145, 1148 (1978) (while ap-
pointment of advisory counsel is a generally fair and commendable practice, it is still discre-
tionary), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1076 (1979); State v. Burgin, 539 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1976) ("a defendant who wishes to act pro se has no right to have counsel appointed
... to serve as ... procedural advisor"); State v. Easton, 35 Or. App. 603, 606, 582 P.2d 37,
39 (1978) (no constitutional right to co-counsel in a pro se defense). These courts, however,
have not articulated precise grounds for refusing to recognize a legal right to counsel. In-
stead, they have generally asserted that the Supreme Court's decision in Faretta does not
mandate the appointment of standby counsel in a pro se defense situation. See, e.g., United
States v. Swinton, 400 F. Supp. 805, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see supra note 73. For federal
cases that have considered the rights to counsel and to appear pro se mutually exclusive, see
infra note 75.
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tance of counsel while conducting his defense.75 Aligning New York
with these jurisdictions, the Court of Appeals, in People v.
Mirenda,6 recently held that a criminal defendant has no consti-
tutional right to standby counsel while conducting a pro se
defense.
In Mirenda, the defendant, charged with grand larceny, crimi-
nal mischief, and various counts of criminal possession of stolen
property,7 8 was permitted by the trial court to conduct a pro se
defense pursuant to his postarraignment request to do so.7 The
court, however, refused to appoint standby counsel to aid the de-
fendant in his defense. 0 Prior to the trial, the defendant requested
the assistance of counsel two more times.8 1 After conducting a
lengthy inquiry to ascertain whether the defendant was aware of
the dangers of self-representation,"2 the lower court determined
that the defendant fully appreciated the risks involved in proceed-
ing pro se and made a knowing and intelligent decision to defend
in that fashion.83 The court accordingly denied each of the defen-
75 See, e.g., United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394, 396 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
835 (1974); United States v. Condor, 423 F.2d 904, 907-08 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
958 (1970); see also United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1975) (as long as the
defendant retained experienced counsel, he could not appear pro se), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1059 (1976); United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 1964) (choice between
defense by a lawyer and defense pro se); United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006, 1010 (2d
Cir.) (rights to assistance of counsel and to appear pro se "cannot both be exercised at the
same time"), aff'd on rehearing, 138 F.2d 831 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 794 (1943);
United States v. Swinton, 400 F. Supp. 805, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("defendant's appearance
as co-counsel lies within the discretion of the trial court").
76 57 N.Y.2d 261, 442 N.E.2d 49, 455 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1982).
77 Id. at 264, 442 N.E.2d at 50, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 753.
78 Id. The charges resulted from a police raid on a Yonkers garage in which a car-
dismantling operation was being conducted. Id. at 264-65, 442 N.E.2d at 50, 455 N.Y.S.2d at
753. The defendant Mirenda was apprehended as he was driving his car behind a truck
laden with auto parts that had just left the garage. Id. at 265, 442 N.E.2d at 50, 455
N.Y.S.2d at 753. In addition to the defendant, the truck driver and two other men inside the
garage were arrested. Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. The defendant requested that the court appoint counsel to will "act only as an
advisor." Id. This request, in essence, is for the appointment of standby counsel. See Note,
Assistance of Counsel: A Right to Hybrid Representation, 57 B.U.L. Rv. 570, 570 (1977).
81 57 N.Y.2d at 265, 442 N.E.2d at 50, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 753. Mirenda sought standby
counsel when he initially sought to appear pro se, as well as during the trial court's inquiry
into whether the defendant understood the pitfalls of self-representation. Id.
82 Id.
83 See id. Although no actual colloquy between the lower court and the defendant with
respect to the latter's capability to proceed pro se is reported in the Mirenda opinion, the
majority did refer to the defendant's "familiarity with legal principles and courtroom proce-
dures." Id. at 266, 442 N.E.2d at 51, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 754.
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dant's requests for standby counsel.14 The defendant thereafter
was convicted, 5 and the Appellate Division, Second Department,
affirmed without opinion."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Chief Judge
Cooke, writing for the majority, 8 observed that while a criminal
defendant is guaranteed the right to counsel and the right to ap-
pear pro se by both the federal and state constitutions,9 a defen-
dant who chooses to conduct his own defense enjoys no concomi-
tant right to representation." Though recognizing that the
discretionary appointment of standby counsel had received judicial
approval,91 the Court nevertheless declined to elevate this form of
84 Id. at 265, 442 N.E.2d at 50, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 753.
85 Id. Mirenda's codefendant, the truck driver, was represented by counsel and was ac-
quitted of all charges. Id. On appeal, Mirenda challenged the introduction at trial of materi-
als seized from an attach6 case in his car, as well as the exclusive nature of the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel. Id. at 267, 442 N.E.2d at 51, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 754. During his pro se
representation at the suppression hearing, the court determined that Mirenda had con-
sented to a search of his car, but not of certain "legal papers" that he contended were in the
automobile. Id. At the time of Mirenda's apprehension, the arresting officers consented not
to examine these papers, but they then found an attach6 case in the trunk of the car. Id.
The police opened the case in the defendant's presence and found "identification tags" from
various vehicles as well as other incriminating items. Id. The lower court determined that
the defendant's limited consent to the search of his car did encompass permission to open
the attach6 case. The Court of Appeals determined that this conclusion did not constitute
legal error. Id.
88 People v. Mirenda, 81 App. Div. 2d 1046, 439 N.Y.S.2d 786 (2d Dep't 1981) (mem.).
87 People v. Mirenda, 57 N.Y.2d 261, 442 N.E.2d 49, 455 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1982).
88 Chief Judge Cooke was joined in the majority opinion by Judges Jasen, Jones, Wach-
tler and Fuchsberg. Judge Meyer filed a dissenting opinion, and Judge Gabrielli took no
part in the consideration of the case.
89 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; see supra notes 72-73.
90 57 N.Y.2d at 264, 442 N.E.2d at 50, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 753. The Mirenda Court inter-
preted the language of the state constitution, which declares that a "party accused shall be
allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel," to guarantee that a defendant
who chooses to defend by counsel does not lose his right to appear personally in the court-
room. Id. at 265 n.*, 442 N.E.2d at 50 n.*, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 753 n.*. The Court further noted
that although recognition of a federal constitutional right to standby counsel has been urged
by several commentators, see infra note 105, "[tlhe fact remains that a Sixth Amendment
right to such a form of representation has not been adopted," 57 N.Y.2d at 266 n.*, 442
N.E.2d at 51 N.*, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 754 n.*; see United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394, 396 (9th
Cir.) (constitution does not guarantee defendant discretion to select a particular form of
representation), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 835 (1974); United States v. Condor, 423 F.2d 904,
907-08 (6th Cir.) (waiver of right to counsel constitutes "correlative assertion" of a pro se
defense), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 958 (1970).
81 57 N.Y.2d at 265-66 n.*, 442 N.E.2d at 50-51 n.*, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 753-54 n.*; see also
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE TRIAL JUDGE'S FUNCTION 6-3.7 (2d ed. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS]. The ABA Standards state:
When a defendant has been permitted to proceed without the assistance of coun-
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representation to the level of a constitutional right.9 2 Rather, Chief
Judge Cooke noted, the assignment of standby counsel is simply a
matter of trial management that lies solely within the discretion of
the trial judge.' Upon finding that the record revealed no abuse of
discretion,94 the Court concluded that the defendant's requests for
standby counsel properly were denied. 5
Judge Meyer, in a vigorous dissent, noted that the sixth
amendment's "assistance of counsel" language and the state con-
stitution's "in person and with counsel" terminology gave an ac-
cused protective rights.9 " The dissent further observed that noth-
ing in the case law97 or the constitutional history"8 compelled the
conclusion that the right to counsel and the right to appear pro se
were mutually exclusive.9 Rather, the dissent emphasized the
right to counsel exists to "aid" criminal defendants, and to serve
"'as an "assistance" for the accused.' ",00 Accordingly, after find-
ing that the appointment of standby counsel would neither unduly
burden the court nor disrupt the course of a criminal trial,101 Judge
sel, the trial judge should consider the appointment of standby counsel to assist
the defendant when called upon and to call the judge's attention to matters
favorable to the accused upon which the judges should rule on his or her motion.
Standby counsel should always be appointed in cases expected to be long or com-
plicated or in which there are multiple defendants.
ABA STANDARDS, supra, at 6.37.
92 57 N.Y.2d at 266, 442 N.E.2d at 51, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 754.
$3 Id.
94 Id. In reviewing the trial court's treatment of the defendant's request to proceed pro
se, the Mirenda Court implicitly noted the preliminary requirements that must be satisfied
before a criminal defendant may conduct such a defense. Id.; see People v. McIntyre, 35
N.Y.2d 10, 16-17, 324 N.E.2d 322, 327, 364 N.Y.S.2d 837, 844 (1974); supra note 73. The
Court observed that the trial judge had conducted a lengthy colloquy with the defendant,
and, throughout the inquiry, the defendant expressed his appreciation of the dangers at-
tendant to a pro se defense as well as his familarity with courtroom procedures. See 57
N.Y.2d at 266, 442 N.E.2d at 51, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 754.
91 See 57 N.Y.2d at 266-67, 442 N.E.2d at 51, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 754.
Id. at 267-68, 442 N.E.2d at 52, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 755 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
- Id. at 268, 442 N.E.2d at 52, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 755 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
8 Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting). The dissent buttressed the argument that the Constitu-
tion does not prohibit the concurrent exercise of the right to counsel and the right to pro-
ceed pro se by tracing the history of representation in criminal trials from the early English
common law to several modem commentators' views that the sixth amendment rights need
not be mutually exclusive. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting).
" Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting).
100 Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820, 832
(1975)).
101 Id. at 269, 442 N.E.2d at 52, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 755 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Judge
Meyer observed that the appointment of standby counsel in pro se defense cases would not
impose any greater burden upon the state in terms of time or money than is caused by the
19831
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Meyer concluded that a pro* se defendant has a constitutional right
to the assistance of standby counsel.102
It is submitted that the Mirenda Court properly refused rec-
ognition of a constitutional right to standby counsel since a pro se
defendant is already accorded sufficient constitutional protec-
tion.103 As long as judicial precaution is taken to ensure that a de-
fendant's waiver of counsel had been knowingly and intelligently
made,0 4 the forfeiture of the right to counsel poses no constitu-
provision of such counsel for a defendant who does not wish to appear pro se. Id. (Meyer, J.,
dissenting). This is especially convincing, Judge Meyer asserted, since the Court has recog-
nized a trial judge's ability to impose standby counsel "even over the objection of the ac-
cused." Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the dissent stated that "a Trial Judge
[need not] permit the provision of standby counsel to a defendant to be used as an instru-
ment of disruption." Id. at 269, 442 N.E.2d at 52, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 756. (Meyer, J., dissent-
ing) (citations omitted).
102 Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting).
OS At the outset it should be noted that the right to counsel exists to balance the ine-
quality of position between the accused and the state. The Supreme Court itself has recog-
nized that "[in an adversary system of criminal justice, there is no right more essential than
the right to the assistance of counsel." Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341 (1978). Indeed,
the fact that lawyers are hired both to prosecute and to defend alleged criminals supports
the "widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries." Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). It should be mentioned, however, that notwith-
standing the apparent lack of wisdom involved in an accused's decision to proceed pro se,
see, e.g., United States v. Spencer, 439 F.2d 1047, 1051 (2d Cir. 1971); People v. Kelly, 60
App. Div. 2d 220, 223, 400 N.Y.S.2d 82, 84 (1st Dep't 1977), aff'd mem., 44 N.Y.2d 725, 376
N.E.2d 931, 405 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1978), pro se representation effectuates the fundamental
principle that "the right to defend is personal," since the defendant, and not the state, will
bear the consequences of conviction, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
104 See supra note 73. An appropriate "colloquy on the record between the judge and
defendant" serves to test the defendant's appreciation of his waiver of counsel and also
provides an objective basis for review. United States v. Bailey, 675 F.2d 1292, 1300 (D.C.
Cir. 1982). The colloquy between the judge and the defendant should reveal the defendant's
age, see, e.g., United States v Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182, 187 (9th Cir. 1973), educational back-
ground, id., and prior familiarity with courtroom procedures and legal principles, see, e.g.,
People v. Mirenda, 57 N.Y.2d at 266, 442 N.E.2d at 51, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 754. The trial judge,
however, should not be required to place in the record all of the information about the
accused that conceivably might impact upon the defendant's decision to represent himself.
Martin v. State, 630 S.W.3d 952, 954 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (en banc). Instead, the
"approach is to provide awareness of problems in the undertaking so that the decision [to
appear pro se] is not lightly made." Id. In People v. Sawyer, 57 N.Y.2d 12, 438 N.E.2d 1133,
453 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 830 (1983), the Court of Appeals deter-
mined that the trial court's statements that the defendant was "facing a very serious
charge" and that "your own best interests are probably served by having a lawyer represent
you" did not satisfy its responsibility to engage in a "searching inquiry." Id. at 21, 438
N.E.2d at 1138, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 423. The Court of Appeals thus requires that the record
reveal a "searching inquiry" of the defendant to ascertain whether the "'dangers and disad-
vantages' of giving up the fundamental right to counsel have been impressed on [him]." Id.;
see also People v. Kelly, 60 App. Div. 2d 220, 223, 400 N.Y.S.2d 82, 84 (1st Dep't 1977), aff'd
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tional difficulty. 1"5 Moreover, even if after such precaution the de-
fendant chooses not to be represented by an attorney, the trial
judge in his discretion may appoint standby counsel. 106 Indeed, ap-
pellate courts, including the Court of Appeals, have consistently
endorsed the discretionary appointment of standby lawyer assis-
tance when necessary to protect the rights of a criminal
defendant.10 7
Elevating standby counsel to the status of a constitutional
right, it is suggested, would afford a pro se defendant too great a
benefit. A number of tactical advantages accrue to a pro se defen-
dant that do not inure to a defendant who is represented by an
attorney, including the right to elicit sympathy from the jury be-
cause of his counsel-less defense and the opportunity to cast his
mem., 44 N.Y.2d 725, 376 N.E.2d 931, 405 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1978).
101 Compare United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457, 463 n.2 (2d Cir. 1975) ("nothing in
Faretta or in any statute.. . suggests that a defendant may both have an attorney and
represent himself") (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1059 (1976) and United
States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 1964) (rights to counsel and to defend pro se
are "two faces of the same coin;" choice between the two is sometimes termed waiver or
election) with Garcia, Defense Pro Se, 23 U. MAMI L. REV. 551, 563-64 (1969) (automatic
denial of advisory counsel to pro se defendant is "unsound and is inconsistent with both the
meaning and the spirit of the right involved") and Note, The Pro Se Defendant's Right to
Counsel, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 927, 940 (1972) (neither language of sixth amendment nor needs
of pro se defendant justify an either/or interpretation of right to assistance of counsel).
106 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
107 See, e.g., United States v. Spencer, 439 F.2d 1047, 1051 (2d Cir. 1971); Reliford v.
People, 195 Colo. 549, 579 P.2d 1145, 1148, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1076 (1978); Wake v.
Barker, 514 S.W.2d 692, 696-97 (Ky. Ct. App. 1974); People v. Sawyer, 57 N.Y.2d 12, 22, 438
N.E.2d 1133, 1139, 453 N.Y.S.2d 418, 424 (1982) (dictum), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 830
(1983). The Court of Appeals recently commented upon the discretionary ability of a trial
judge to allow a pro se defendant to have the assistance of counsel. See People v. Sawyer, 57
N.Y.2d 12, 22, 438 N.E.2d 1133, 1139, 453 N.Y.S.2d 418, 424 (1982), cert. denied, 51
U.S.L.W. 3553 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1983). In Sawyer, the Court stated:
[W]here a defendant decides on self-representation, a Judge "may-even over ob-
jection by the accused-appoint a 'standby counsel' to aid the accused if and
when the accused requests help, and to be available to represent the accused in
the event that termination of the defendant's self-representation is necessary." It
may be advisable to do so to protect the defendant and to facilitate the trial ....
Id. at 22, 438 N.E.2d at 1139, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 424 (quoting Faretta v. California, 22 U.S.
806, 835 n.46 (1975)) (citation omitted). In Sawyer, the trial court rejected the defendant's
request to substitute counsel on the basis of a conflict of interest. 57 N.Y.2d at 15, 438
N.E.2d at 1135, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 420. The defendant thereafter presented his counsel-less
defense. Id. at 18, 438 N.E.2d at 1136, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 421. Upon review of the record, the
Court of Appeals determined that the trial court had not adequately ascertained whether
the defendant was aware of the risks inherent in self-representation, and therefore ordered a
new trial. Id. at 21-22, 438 N.E.2d at 1138, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 423-24. It thus appears that the
Court's statement, though dictum, represents its willingness to permit discretionary ap-
pointment of standby counsel.
1983]
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defense in moral rather than legal terms.108 Perhaps the greatest of
these advantages is the opportunity to have the jury view his de-
meanor, and, to some extent, examine his character without the
concomitant risk of impeachment by the prosecution.10 9 While a
defendant who is represented solely by counsel is virtually pre-
cluded from these tactical possibilities, a pro se defendant who re-
ceives standby counsel ostensibly obtains these advantages as well
as those of representation. Thus, it is submitted, such a defendant
is afforded an unparalleled advantage in the presentation of his
case. This is especially true when standby counsel is of the co-
counsel variety, which permits the attorney to direct the technical
aspects of the trial while the defendant himself sets its emotional
tone.110 It appears, therefore, that as long as trial courts exercise
108 See Garcia, supra note 105, at 551-52; Note, supra note 105, at 932; Comment, Self
Representation in Criminal Trials: The Dilemma of the Pro Se Defendant, 59 CALIF. L.
REV. 1479, 1499 (1971). In addition to advantages of a moral or emotional nature, a defen-
dant who proceeds in a pro se fashion benefits from potential delay and confusion caused by
such a defense, as well as the ability to lay the groundwork for a mistrial or subsequent
challenge to a conviction. See People v. McIntyre, 36 N.Y.2d 10, 16, 324 N.E.2d 322, 326,
364 N.Y.S.2d 837, 843-44 (1974).
109 See People v. McIntyre, 36 N.Y.2d 10, 16, 324 N.E.2d 322, 326-27, 364 N.Y.S.2d 837,
843-44 (1974). The Supreme Court has described the waiver of the privilege against self-
incrimination in the following manner:
[The accused] has the choice, after weighing the advantage of the privilege against
self-incrimination against the advantage of putting forward his version of the facts
and his reliability as a witness, not to testify at all. He cannot reasonably claim
that the Fifth Amendment gives him not only this choice but, if he elects to tes-
tify, an immunity from cross-examination on matters he has himself put in
dispute.
Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155-56 (1958). When a defendant testifies in his own'
behalf, his credibility may be attacked by the same methods that are available to impeach
an ordinary witness. See generally W. RICHARDSON, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 525, at 515
(J. Prince 10th ed. 1973). It would appear, however, that a criminal pro se defendant will be
able, in effect, to appear in his own behalf without waiving his privilege against self-
incrimination.
110 The simultaneous exercise of the sixth amendment rights to counsel and to appear
pro se has been characterized as hybrid representation. See, e.g., Note, supra note 80, at
570. This hybrid representation has manifested itself in two forms. The advisory counsel
variety allows the attorney to serve as a coach to the defendant, and to assume active coun-
sel duties should the pro se defense be terminated. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Estell, 681 F.2d 266,
273 (5th Cir. 1982). The co-counsel form of representation permits both the attorney and
the defendant to actively present the case. See Case Note, Hybrid Representation-An Ac-
cused Has No Constitutional Right in Texas to Representation Partially Pro Se and Par-
tially by Counsel, 9 TEx. TECH L. REV. 323, 326 n.22 (1977-1978). Although the Mirenda
dissent did not define the precise role of standby counsel, it appears that Judge Meyer en-
visaged the use of standby counsel in an advisory capacity. 57 N.Y.2d at 269, 442 N.E.2d at
53, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 755 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Indeed, Judge Meyer relied upon Wiggins v.
Estell, 681 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982) in which the Fifth Circuit adopted the position that
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the utmost scrutiny in ensuring that a defendant's decision to pro-
ceed pro se is an informed one, the Mirenda holding is fair to both
the pro se defendant and the criminal justice system.111
Donna M. Hitscherich
An employee who is hired for no specific duration but who has
received assurances that he would not be terminated without just
cause may maintain a breach of contract action for wrongful
termination
Pursuant to the employment-at-will doctrine,112 unless the du-
ration of employment is specified, the employment relationship
standby counsel is "'to be seen, but not heard."' Id. at 273. The Wiggins Court further
amplified this position by stating that "[standby counsel] is not to compete with the defen-
dant or supersede his defense, [but] [r]ather, his presence is there for advisory purposes
only, to be used or not used as the defendant sees fit." Id. (footnotes omitted).
"I A pro se defendant essentially is held to the same standards of courtroom procedure
as is a criminal defendant who is represented by counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Duja-
novic, 486 F.2d 182, 188 (9th Cir. 1973). Pragmatically, however, trial judges sometimes at-
tempt to aid the pro se defendant. See, e.g., Grubbs v. State, 255 Ind. 411, 416, 265 N.E.2d
40, 43-44 (1970). Furthermore, a judge who presides over a criminal trial being conducted by
a pro se defendant "must be especially acute and vigilant in governing the conduct of coun-
sel and witnesses ...... Id., 265 N.E.2d at 44. The defendant, moreover, may not use his
constitutional right to appear pro se in order to disrupt the court proceedings. See Faretta
v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975). Thus, in the interests of an orderly trial proce-
dure, a trial judge may be prompted to appoint standby counsel for a pro se defendant
United States v. Spencer, 439 F.2d 1047, 1051 (2d Cir. 1971).
12 The employment-at-will doctrine was derived from the common-law principles of
master and servant which existed until the middle of the 19th century. See generally
Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of
Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. Rav. 1404, 1416 (1967); Committee on Labor and Employ-
ment Law, At-Will Employment and the Unjust Dismissal, 36 REc. A.B. CrTy N.Y. 170,
170-71 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Committee on Labor Law]; DeGiuseppe, The Effect of
the Employment-At-Will Rule on Employee Rights to Job Security and Fringe Benefits, 10
FoRDHAM URs. L.J. 1, 3-4 (1981-1982); Feerick, Employment At Will, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 5, 1979,
at 1, col. 1; Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL
HisT. 118, 118-20, 122-23 (1976); Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful
Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HAv. L. REv. 1816, 1824 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as HARvARD Note]. English common law regarded the employment rela-
tionship as founded upon contract principles. When an employee was hired for an indefinite
period, the term of employment was presumed to be 1 year. See Committee on Labor Law,
supra, at 171; DeGiuseppe, supra, at 4; Feinman, supra, at 120. The English rule was ac-
cepted generally in the United States until the end of the 19th century. See Committee on
Labor Law, supra, at 171; DeGiuseppe, supra, at 5-6; Feinman, supra, at 122; see also Ad-
ams v. Fitzpatrick, 125 N.Y. 127, 129, 26 N.E. 143, 145 (1891). At that time, the laissez-faire
political and economic theory that developed from American industrial growth significantly
